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INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES: IS THE EFFECT OF
INCOME TAXES A PROPER INQUIRY FOR THE
COURT OR JURY IN PERSONAL INJURY
OR WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS?
KRISTIN A. NILSSON
I. INTRODUCTION
F EDERAL INCOME TAXES are an unavoidable aspect
of modern life. With few exceptions, the Federal In-
come Tax Code requires those who receive income to file
a return.' Various provisions of the Code specify what
should and should not be included in the taxable income
of the recipient.2 Most sources of income are taxable un-
less specifically excluded by a particular Code provision.
Section 104 of the Code contains one specific exclu-
sion.4 This section excludes "any damages received... on
I.R.C. § 6012 (1987). Section 6012(a) states the general rule that "[r]eturns
with respect to income taxes .. .shall be made by the following: (1)(A) [elvery
individual having for the taxable year gross income which equals or exceeds the
exemption amount. ... ." Id. Following the general rule, a list of exceptions ex-
empts certain individuals from making such returns provided the requisite qualifi-
cations are satisfied. Id.
2 The Federal Income Tax Code contains numerous provisions relating to the
computation of taxable income. Id. §§ 61-291. Sections 61 through 67 set out the
basic definitions, beginning with gross income. Id. §§ 61-67; see infra note 3 for
the definition of "gross income." Sections 71 through 89 continue by specifying
those items that are specifically included in gross income. Id. §§ 71-89. Items
that are specifically excluded from gross income are listed in sections 101 through
135. Id. §§ 101-135; see infra notes 4-7 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the section 104 exclusion regarding compensation for injuries or sickness. Provi-
sions relating to deductions and additional exclusions follow. Id. §§ 141-291.
Id. § 61. Section 61(a) provides that "gross income means all income from
whatever source derived .. "
Id. § 104. Section 104(a) provides:
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account of personal injuries" from the gross income of
the recipient. This exclusion "extends to personal injury
damages allocable to lost wages."6 The result of this ex-
clusion is that the injured party often receives damage
awards from personal injury suits and wrongful death ac-
tions free of any adverse tax consequences.7
This provision is the subject of much debate in the
courts.8 Two primary questions concerning the effect of
(a) In General - Except in the case of amounts attributable to
(and not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relat-
ing to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross in-
come does not include -
(1) ...
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or
agreement and whether as lump sum or as periodic payments) on
account of personal injuries or sickness ....
Id.
Id. For a more detailed analysis of damages awards and their taxability, see
Jaeger, Owens & Field, Taxability of Damages, 18 TAx ADVISER 432 (1987).
' Jaeger, Owens & Field, supra note 5, at 432; see also Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2
C.B. 50. The recovery of lost wages in a personal injury action is viewed as com-
pensating for the injury and not as true wages. Note, Instructing the Jury on the
Taxability of Their Awards - But First, How Are They Taxed?, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc.
299, 309 (1985).
7 Annotation, Damages - Consideration of Income Taxes, 16 A.L.R.4th 589, 592
(1982). In addition to exemption from federal income taxes, damage awards in a
personal injury or wrongful death action are often similarly exempted from state
income taxes. Id. at 592-93. However, punitive damages are an exception to the
general rule that "any" personal injury damages are excludable. Initially, Reve-
nue Ruling 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47 provided that personal injury damages, includ-
ing both compensatory and punitive damages, were excludable due to the "any"
damages language of section 104(a)(2). I.R.C. § 104 (1987). The Tax Court fol-
lowed this rationale in Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir.
1983), the first case to apply Revenue Ruling 75-45. See Note, supra note 6, at 305-
06. In 1984, the Internal Revenue Service, reasoning that punitive damages are
not compensatory but are awarded based on the defendant's "degree of fault,"
reversed Revenue Ruling 75-45. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34. Revenue
Ruling 84-108 provided that punitive damages are taxable in all circumstances. As
a result, the nature of damages controls the taxability of those damages. Roemer,
in conjuction with Revenue Ruling 84-108, indicates that the "nature" of damages
is determined by reference to state law.
I Uncertainty as to the courts' tax treatment of damage awards has resulted in
problems for taxpayers who are seeking damages. Jaeger, Owens & Field, supra
note 5, at 433-34. In particular, because the tax consequences of certain damages
remain in dispute, it is difficult to determine the actual amount the taxpayer will
receive after taxes. Id. at 440. In addition, this vagueness produces doubt as to
the amount the taxpayer should ask for and how he should apportion that request.
Id.
income taxes arise.9 The first inquiry is whether the in-
come tax allocable to lost wages or lost support should be
deducted from the total amount awarded. The second is
whether it is proper to instruct the jury that personal in-
jury and wrongful death awards which are based on lost
wages are not subject to taxation.
In many cases, the answer to both questions is deter-
mined by the applicable state law.' 0 In other cases, the
outcome depends upon the particular federal statute in-
volved."I In either case, it is a subject of great concern for
many industries, including the airline industry. The
larger the potential award, the greater the concern.
This comment analyzes whether the effect of income
taxes is a proper inquiry for the court or for the jury in
personal injury or wrongful death actions. Part I sets up a
general introduction to this analysis, while Part II of this
comment contains a general overview of the arguments
both for and against the consideration of taxes when cal-
culating damage awards.' 2 Part III addresses considera-
tion of tax effects on an award for loss of income. 13 Part
IV focuses on the propriety of instructing the jury regard-
ing the taxability of an award." Finally, Part V reviews
two recent aircrash cases in which the effect of income
taxes was considered on appeal, demonstrating the criti-
, Although some courts have confused these two questions, they are separate
issues with a different analysis applying to each. See Elligett, Income Tax Considera-
tions in Florida Personal Injury Actions, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 643, 643-44 (1982).
Moreover, while most jurisdictions do not distinguish between personal injury
and wrongful death actions, exceptions do exist in which a different rule is applied
depending on the type of action involved. Annotation, supra note 7, at 595 n.10,
605 n.24.
" See infra notes 84-99 and 116-137 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the various state positions with respect to the questions presented.
11 See infra notes 51-83 and 107-115 and accompanying text for the relevant
federal position regarding jury or court consideration of income taxes.
12 See infra notes 16-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the general
arguments for and against tax considerations in the determination of damage
awards.
' See infra notes 51-101 and accompanying text for a consideration of the tax
effects on a lost income award.
14 See infra notes 102-140 and accompanying text for a discussion concerning
the propriety of "taxability instructions."
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cal influence that state law can have on the amount of
damages awarded. 15
II. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE EFFECT OF INCOME
TAXES - ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON
Whether the individual courts decide to ignore or con-
sider the tax consequences of a personal injury or wrong-
ful death damage award, the justifications given by the
courts over the years are fairly consistent. The split in au-
thority as to whether the courts should consider income
taxes does not result from the different arguments that
are advanced. The opposing views are simply the conse-
quence of different courts placing more emphasis upon
different considerations and, thereby, following one ra-
tionale over another. Most of the arguments advanced on
both sides are generally made in reference to jury trials.
However, many apply to courts sitting without a jury as
well.
The majority of courts ignores the tax implications of a
damage award.16 These courts advance a variety of rea-
sons in support of this proposition. The most common
justification is the speculative or conjectural nature of fu-
ture taxes. This rationale is based on the number of vari-
ables that might effect a plaintiff's tax liability. 7
Arguably, income tax rates are so subject to change that a
court orjury cannot estimate them with sufficient accuracy
to justify their admission into evidence. Proponents of
the "too speculative" rationale also argue that considera-
Is See infra notes 141-163 and accompanying text for a comparison of two re-
cent aircrash cases involving the tax considerations of a damages award.
- Note, supra note 6, at 311. The majority ofjurisdictions holds that taxability
of income is not a proper consideration. Id. Both instructions as to taxability and
the evidence itself are improper considerations. Id. (quoting Potts, Income Tax Is-
sues in Personal Injury Litigation, 46 MONT. L. REV. 59, 65 (1985)).
,7 Bradford, Measuring Tort Damages for Loss of Earnings Without Deducting Income
Taxes: A Wisconsin Rule Which Lost Its Rationale, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 210, 226 (1987).
The Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, as early as 1944, re-
fused to deduct income taxes from an award for lost earnings. Stokes v. United
States, 144 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944). The court based its refusal on the idea that
such a deduction was "too conjectural." Id.
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tion of income tax is an extraneous subject having insuffi-
cient relevance to the compensatory determination before
the court.' 8 Inquiries into taxation at trial open up mat-
ters that are not directly pertinent to the issues involved. 19
Income taxes are a private matter between the plaintiff
and the government and of no legitimate concern to the
tortfeasor.2 ° Interjecting income tax questions tends to
raise more problems than it solves.2'
Another common argument relates to the complex na-
ture of taxes. Some courts hold that a plaintiff's potential
tax liability is beyond jury expertise and too complex for
them to handle while focusing on the factual issues of the
case. 22  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
18 See Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Gordon, 660 P.2d 428, 434 (Alaska 1983). In Yukon,
the court followed the rationale previously set forth in Alaska Supreme Court de-
cisions and found that the risk of making tax considerations an inappropriate col-
lateral issue at trial outweighed the benefit to the administration ofjustice. Id.
- Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 507-08, 134 N.E.2d 555, 556, petition dis-
missed, 235 Ind. 509, 135 N.E.2d 251 (1956) (personal injury action in which the
court held that introducing taxation issues into the jury instruction was too com-
plex and would open up matters that were not pertinent); see Hall v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955). The Supreme Court of
Illinois stated in Hall that the parties' financial "status" which effectively deter-
mines the taxability of an award is immaterial. Hall, 5 Ill. 2d at 151, 125 N.E.2d at
86. What the plaintiff does with the damages award is of no concern to the de-
fendant or the court. Id.
2-' Lumber Terminals, Inc. v. Nowakowski, 36 Md. App. 82, 373 A.2d 282, 291-
92 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977). In holding that damages for lost income are calcu-
lated using gross income, the court in Lumber Terminals acknowledged the "conjec-
tural or speculative" argument. Id. at 82, 373 A.2d at 291. While the court placed
its reliance on the "extraneous issue" argument, the court expressly stated that
such reliance was not to the exclusion of other relevant factors. Id. at 82, 373
A.2d at 291; see also Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 92 S.E.2d
874, 876 (1956) (stating that it is no concern to the jury what taxes, fees, or costs
are paid by the plaintiff out of his recovery).
2 Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 271 A.2d 94, 97
(1970) (a personal injury action following the "majority rule" that taxes are not a
consideration in determining the amount of damages).
'-2 McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 37 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960). McWeeney, brought under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982), held that although a
refusal to instruct the jury to calculate lost income damages using "net income"
was not error, such an instruction might be proper in the case of a plaintiff with
higher earning power. McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 38, 39. The court also stated that
imposing the duty upon the jury to reduce damages for income taxes might result
in impairment of their ability in other areas. Id. at 37.
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states that three elements influence the determination of
lost earning power: future normal earning power; life ex-
pectancy; and, the present value discount factor. 23 Ad-
ding various other factors, such as income taxes, inflation,
and attorney's fees, burdens the jury with "a task that
[they] cannot reasonably be expected to perform. ' 24  In
considering income tax effects, the court risks making the
tax question a collateral issue at trial, which may over-
shadow the basic issue of liability.25 This result burdens
more than benefits the administration of justice.26
Another explanation supporting the majority view is
that Congress intended to bestow a "benefit" when it en-
acted section 104 of the Federal Income Tax Code. 27 The
recipient of a personal injury award benefits by virtue of
the Congressional decision not to tax that award.28
Although Congress has not articulated its reasoning be-
hind enactment of the section, several courts have in-
ferred that the exclusion was intended to benefit the
victim, rather than the tortfeasor. 29 Through enactment
of section 104, Congress specifically provided an exclu-
sion for personal injury damages and has yet to limit or
repeal that exclusion.30
2.1 McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 35.
.'4 Id. at 37.
25 Yukon, 660 P.2d at 434 (products liability action following the McWeeney rea-
soning in holding that failure to give an instruction regarding taxation is not re-
versible error).
26 Id.
21 See Note, Tort Law - Upon Request, Jurors in a Personal Injury Case Must Be In-
structed That the Damages Awarded Are Not Subject to Federal and State Income Taxes, 13
U. BALT. L. REv. 210, 211 (1983); Hall, 5 Ill. 2d at 152, 125 N.E.2d at 86.
2" Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
29 Id. at 501; Bradford, supra note 17, at 213; see Hall, 5 Ill. 2d at 135, 125
N.E.2d at 86 (the court stated that "[i]f the jury were to mitigate the damages of
the plaintiff by reason of the income tax exemption accorded him, then the very
Congressional intent of the income tax law to give an injured party a tax benefit
would be nullified"); Lumber Terminals, 36 Md. App. at 82, 373 A.2d at 292 (court
held the award should be based on plaintiff's gross earnings and should not be
reduced because of income tax savings resulting from the exemption). The
tortfeasor benefits rather than the victim if the section 104 exemption reduces the
judgment against him. Bradford, supra note 17, at 212.
.- Bradford, supra note 17, at 212.
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Still another rationale opposing the consideration of in-
come taxes by the jury is founded on the idea that the jury
is instructed to determine the award in order to "compen-
sate" the victim. 3 1 Compensatory damages, theoretically,
do not include any surmised loss due to income taxes. A
strong dissent by Justice Blackmun in Norfolk & Western
Ry. v. Liepelt3 2 asserts that a tax liability instruction does
not affect the victim's compensation, the determination of
liability or the calculation of damages. It is "purely cau-
tionary in nature. '3 3  However, since courts cannot pre-
sume that an instruction given to the jury is not followed,
the majority views an instruction to compensate the victim
as sufficient.3 4 The court must assume that the jury will
follow an instruction to compensate the victim since it is
simply not feasible for an instruction to guard against
every possible mistake which the jury might make. 5
A final view in support of the majority position con-
cerns what courts have labeled "offsetting factors." Any
overcompensation that might occur when the court ig-
nores tax consequences is offset when the court also ig-
nores inflation and the plaintiff's attorney fees. 6 A third,
less commonly mentioned, offsetting factor is the fact that
juries do not ordinarily award the plaintiff the "full
amount" of their calculations.3 7
The Second Restatement of Torts (Restatement) sup-
-Note, supra note 6, at 312.
444 U.S. at 498 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); see supra notes 67-70 and accompa-
nying text for further discussion of the case.
." Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 502.
'4 Hall, 5 11. 2d at 135, 125 N.E.2d at 85. In Hall, the court stated that if the
jury is correctly instructed on the measure of damages and told what factors to
consider, the court cannot assume that the jury considered factors other than
those provided to them. Id. In Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524 (Me. 1978),
the court stated that it must presume the jurors reached their decision following
the rules of law given to them. Id. at 536. The court continued by stating that any
other presumption would "assume misconduct on the part of the jury, an as-
sumption in which we are not justified to indulge." Id.
1, Note, supra note 6, at 312. AsJustice Blackmun states, "It does nothing more
than call a basically irrelevant factor to the jury's attention, and then directs the
jury to forget that matter." Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 502.
.4; Bradford, supra note 17, at 229; see McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 38.
.17 McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 38 n.10. The "full amount" is considered the earning
19891 831
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ports the majority view for personal injury suits. 3 8 The
draft states that an award of tort damages is "not aug-
mented or diminished [just] because .. .the award is ...
not subject to taxation. ' 39 No reduction occurs regard-
less of the fact that the award "is to compensate for the
loss of future benefits which would have been subject to
taxation. ' 40  The comments to the Restatement encom-
pass most of the arguments propounded above.4 ' Under
the Restatement view, "[w]hether an award of tort dam-
ages is itself subject to taxation does not and should not
have any effect on the amount of the award." 42
A minority of courts reject the previously discussed ra-
tionales. Instead, these courts hold that tax implications
in a damage award are too significant to justify their ex-
clusion. They reject the "speculative nature" argument
because other variables that are considered in setting a
damage award are also speculative.43 In particular, with
power multiplied by the plaintiff's life expectancy, discounted to present value.
Id.
:,. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914A (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT]. Section 914A reads as follows:
§ 914A EFFECT OF TAXATION.
(1) The amount of an award of tort damages is not augmented or
diminished because of the fact that the award is or is not subject to
taxation.
(2) The amount of an award of tort damages is ordinarily not di-
minished because of the fact that although the award is not itself
taxed, all or a part of it is to compensate for the loss of future
benefits which would have been subject to taxation.
Id. It is important to note that no position is taken with respect to: (1) income tax
considerations of damages for benefits lost prior to the judgment; or (2) income
tax considerations for benefits subject to peculiarly high income tax rates. Id.
-t, Id.
4o Id.
41 Id. The Restatement notes that the Internal Revenue Code excludes per-
sonal injury awards from taxable income. Id. comment a; see I.R.C. § 104 (1987).
Such a provision in the tax code was made for the benefit of the injured party.
RESTATEMENT § 914A comment a. The arguments that this matter is too compli-
cated for the jury and the existence of "countervailing factors" are also addressed.
Id. The draft further recognizes that these arguments do not necessarily apply to
a loss of past earnings. Id.
42 Id.
4 See, e.g., Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 292-93 (9th Cir.
1975) (remanding case to permit evidence regarding impact of income taxes and
non-taxable status of lost-earnings portion of damage award); Floyd v. Fruit In-
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respect to determining an amount which compensates for
lost income, the possibility of future employment and life
expectancy are equally, if not more, unpredictable." In
fact, given the current federal tax provisions and the
amount of national debt, the "existence of the income tax
in the future is a virtual certainty. '45 Additionally,
problems due to speculation and complexity may be sig-
nificantly reduced through the use of expert witness
testimony.4 6
The dominant argument advocating the consideration
of income taxes is that the jury will erroneously assume
the judgment is taxed to the plaintiff and, therefore, will
inflate the damage award to compensate for the presumed
income tax effect.47 Advocates of the minority position ar-
gue that when the majority rule was first established, the
American public was not as "tax conscious" as they are
today.48 Informing the jury that an award is not taxable is
viewed as a simple and uncomplicated way to prevent
such erroneous inflation.
Another reason advanced which supports consideration
of the tax consequences of a plaintiff's lost income is that
the defendant should not be made to compensate a plain-
tiff for a loss the plaintiff did not suffer.49 Had the plaintiff
actually earned the income, he would have paid income
dus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918, 925-26 (1957) (holding that the jury
could consider impact of income taxes in calculating future earnings of decedent).
44 Burlington, 529 F.2d at 293; Bradford, supra note 17, at 226.
- Bradford, supra note 17, at 227.
46 See Burlington, 529 F.2d at 293. The court in Burlington recognized that "to-
day's sophisticated jurors surely have had some personal experience in determin-
ing their own tax liability ...[and] our juries and judges, with the aid of such
competent expert testimony as may be received, are equal to the task and the
responsibility." Id.
17 Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 497-98; Note, supra note 6, at 313. A jury member who is
unfamiliar with the federal income tax provisions is likely to assume that the plain-
tiff is required to pay a portion of the award to the government as taxes. Annota-
tion, supra note 7, at 593.
4 Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 491; Note, supra note 6, at 314.
4.. See McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 40 (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (dissent stated that
plaintiff should receive only the amount necessary to make him whole); see infra
notes 51-60 and accompanying text for further discussion of the McWeeney reason-
ing and decision.
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taxes on that income.50 This particular argument applies
with equal force to lost support. In wrongful death ac-
tions, taxes paid by the decedent would reduce the
amount available for the support of his family. The ulti-
mate issue is whether the defendant should be required to
compensate the plaintiff or the decedent's family for in-
come the plaintiff or decedent would have never received.
III. INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES IN DETERMINING
LOST INCOME
A more specific issue is whether damage awards in per-
sonal injury or wrongful death actions should be deter-
mined using the plaintiff's or decedent's "net" or "gross"
income. Defendants argue that a damage award is prop-
erly calculated by estimating and deducting the amount
that would have been paid in income taxes. Plaintiffs, on
the other hand, contend that the correct amount is deter-
mined without deducting income taxes on the income
lost. Because of the differing viewpoints, decisions from
federal courts and from state courts warrant separate
analysis.
A. Federal Decisions
The position taken by federal courts with respect to the
income tax issue has changed dramatically over the years.
The initial view, clearly enunciated in McWeeney v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. ,5 maintained that it was
improper to deduct income taxes from a loss of earnings
5,, Annotation, supra note 7, at 593. Especially with respect to a damage award
attributable to a recovery period or long-term impairment, the award is compen-
sating what would have qualified as "taxable" income had it been earned. Id.
r, 282 F.2d at 34 (the McWeeney court considered whether income taxes are an
essential factor in calculating lost income and whether to instruct the jury that
any damages awarded are not taxable income); see infra notes 102-140 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the propriety of instructing the jury as to the
taxability of an award. The court in McWeeney was not considering the relevancy
of income taxes on damages awards for the first iime. The court even references
an earlier decision, Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944), and ex-
pressly adheres to the decision in Stokes where federal law is concerned or applica-
ble state law is silent. McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 39.
[54
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award. McWeeney, a FELA action, upheld the trial court's
refusal to instruct the jury to consider only the plaintiff's
net income in determining future loss of earnings.52 The
court determined that the jury should consider three ele-
ments when it calculated damages: future normal earning
power, life expectancy, and the present value discount
factor.5 3 Regardless of the speculation and complications
inherent in those three factors, these difficulties did not
require the jury to consider other elements.54 The court
held that additional elements would impose an unrealistic
and unreasonable task upon the jury.55 The court also
recognized the existence of counterbalancing factors,
such as inflation and attorney fees, which offset the possi-
bility of an excessive jury verdict.56 However, the court
expressly confined its holding to cases which the plaintiff
brought under federal law or in which state law was
silent.57
This rule set out in McWeeney was not absolute, allowing
flexibility for cases involving particular circumstances.58
-McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 39. The court expressly followed Stokes, 144 F.2d at
87, which held that a refusal to consider (deduct) income taxes in estimating lost
earnings was not error. McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 39.
5 McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 35. However, the court pointed out that when an in-
jured plaintiff is only partially disabled, it must consider post accident earning
power as a fourth factor. Id. at 35 n.3.
54 Id. at 36.
.- Id. at 36-37. The court stated that giving an instruction would "[impose] on
the jury a task that the jury cannot reasonably be expected to perform ... [and]
would be likely to impair the quality of [the jury's] performance .... Id. at 37.
56 Id. at 37-38.
.7 Id. at 39. Although the court in McWeeney was following the holding set out
in Stokes, the court explicitly limited its adherence to Stokes to cases where "the
question is one of federal law or the applicable state law is silent . I..." d.; see
Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaraquense, S.A., 364 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1966)
(holding that where New Jersey Wrongful Death Act was silent with respect to
consideration of income tax in computing death awards, judge erred in deducting
taxes from decedent's projected gross income); cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
5'McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 38-39. The court noted that "[t]here may be cases
where failure to make some adjustment for ... income taxes would produce an
improper result .... Id at 38. The court further recognized the need to draw a
line to determine when the "high income" of the plaintiff justified consideration
of income taxes, but left it to the discretion of the trial judges to draw that line.
Id. at 39; see Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968). In Cox, the decedent, killed in an airplane crash, had
836 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
Despite the McWeeney court's refusal to instruct that lost
income is calculated on net income, the court recognized
cases in which failure to make suczh an instruction would
produce an incorrect result.59 An instruction regarding
taxes was proper, for instance, if the plaintiff had "great
earning power. '60
Eventually, Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger6" recog-
nized the inherent inequity of a damage award that ig-
nores income tax consequences, thus allowing the plaintiff
to take home his "gross pay." In Burlington, the survivors
of a deceased railroad employee brought suit under
FELA.62 The Ninth Circuit applied the basic principle
that the "primary aim in measuring damages has been
compensation . . .[to] place the injured person as nearly
as possible in the condition he would have occupied had
the wrong not occurred .... "63 After addressing objec-
tions to the consideration of taxes, the court concluded
that "as a matter of fairness and logic, the just approach
would require a rule providing for the admissibility of evi-
dence of, and corresponding deduction to account for, fu-
ture income taxes in all cases."64 However, recognizing
a projected range of lost earnings between $15,655 to $20,608 per annum. Id. at
896. Effectively relying on the rationale set out in McWeeney, the court stated that
under those circumstances the "impact of income tax has a significant and sub-
stantial effect in the computation and may not be ignored." Id.
m, McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 38. The court recited the situation in which a plaintiff
had potential earnings of$100,000 annually, half of which would be consumed by
income taxes. Id. The court stated that in such a situation, an award based on
gross earnings would be "plainly excessive." Id. The court, however, expressly
left the line between high incomes which required consideration of income taxes
and lower or middle incomes, which did not, to be drawn at the discretion of the
trial judges. Id.
,;.. Id. at 38-39; see LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 276
(2d Cir.) (stating that McWeeney "left open the possibility that adjustment for in-
come taxes would be proper if the income were so high that the award would
otherwise be excessive ...."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965); Montellier v.
United States, 315 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that Montellier's poten-
tial earnings were not so clearly above the "middle reach of the income scale" that
it was erroneous not to make such a deduction).
529 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 286.
Id. at 291 (quoting C. MCCORMACK, LAW OF DAMAGES 560 (1935)).
64 Id. at 294.
the potential conflict with other circuits, the court refused
to adopt such a broad rule.65 Since the lost income calcu-
lated in Burlington was beyond "the lower or middle
reaches of the income scale" and income taxes thus had
the required "significant and substantial effect," the court
simply held that the case fell within the McWeeney excep-
tion.66 Therefore, although the court recognized the
need to adjust damage awards for income taxes, it did not
expressly hold that such adjustment was proper in all
cases.
The rule applicable in federal actions was finally estab-
lished in Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Liepelt.67 In Liepelt, the
Supreme Court held that a determination of lost support
under FELA is undeniably influenced by the federal in-
come tax the decedent would have been required to pay.68
Recognizing that damage award issues in a FELA action
are federal in character, the court stated that the federal
character of FELA damages remains even when the action
is brought in state court.69 Focusing on the ability of the
bar to present tax considerations to the jury in an under-
standable manner and on the "tax consciousness" of the
American public, the court found that the decedent's in-
come tax was a relevant consideration in calculating his
lost future earnings.7 °
The Supreme Court adopted this position three years
- Id. The court stated that adopting so broad a rule would place it in conflict
with a number of circuits which have adopted the McWeeney approach. Id.
Id. at 295.
, 444 U.S. 490, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980). For a further discussion of
Liepelt, see infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text. See also Vasina v. Grumman
Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1981). In Vasina, a wrongful death action fol-
lowing the crash of a Navy airplane, the court refused to follow the reasoning of
Liepelt and held that current New York law supported the lower court's refusal to
permit evidence or jury instruction regarding taxability of a lost income award
and that such refusal was not error. Id.
- Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 493. After-tax dollars provide the only realistic measure
of the amount of wages actually lost. Id.
ni, Id. Since both Burlington and Liepelt involve FELA actions, arguably, the rea-
soning behind the court's decision is equally applicable to any personal injury
suit. See Elligett, supra note 9, at 646.
7,, Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 494-98.
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later in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. V. Pfeifer.7' The Court in
Pfeifer held that a damage award in a personal injury ac-
tion under federal maritime law should reflect after-tax
earnings. 2 The Court concluded that it cannot determine
an appropriate compensatory award without first consid-
ering the income it purports to replace.73 Thus, a "lost
stream of income" is calculated by approximating a series
of after-tax payments.74
In addition to actions brought under FELA, another
common federal statutory cause of action is found in the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 75 Subject to certain re-
strictions, the FTCA requires a federal court to determine
damages in accordance with the applicable state law.76
However, in applying state law, the court must subtract
income tax when it determines an FTCA award for lost
support. 77 This calculation is necessary due to the corn-
71 462 U.S. 523 (1983). In Pfeifer, an employee was injured while working as a
loading helper on a Pennsylvania coal barge. Id. at 525. The respondent brought
suit under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-948a (Supp. IV 1986). Ifeifer, 462 U.S. at 526. Actions brought under this
act are governed by federal maritime law. Id. at 547.
72 Id. at 534.
,., Id. at 533.
71 Id. at 536.
7 The Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401, 424, 60 Stat. 842
(1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 2401-2402, 2411-
2412, 2671-2680 (1982)).
7,; The government of the United States is generally liable to the claimant "in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28
U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1982). Thus, the United States is liable "to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances," but is not liable "for interest prior to
judgment or for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). See Barrett v.
United States, 660 F. Supp. 1291, 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that "the FTCA
requires a federal court to follow state law in determining damages .... ).
77 Because section 2674 provides for "actual or compensatory damages,"
courts have found this requires a deduction for federal income taxes, at least when
the earnings are substantial. Shaw v. United States, 741 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir.
1984) (income tax withheld from damage award in FTCA claim brought on behalf
of baby born with severe brain damage due to negligence of army hospital medi-
cal staff); Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir. 1983) (taxes on
future income not included in damages awarded to comatose plaintiff injured in
collision with vehicle driven by federal employee), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226
(1984). Failure to deduct income tax compensates the plaintiff for more than "ac-
tual" loss and is therefore deemed punitive, and punitive damages cannot be
awarded when the defendant is the United States. Flannery, 718 F.2d at 111.
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pensatory nature of the FTCA.7 s Income taxes are thus
considered despite applicable state law to the contrary.7 9
Therefore, a relevant consideration for parties bringing
diversity suits in federal court is which law the court will
apply.80 The allowance or preclusion of income. tax con-
sideration with respect to lost income by the particular
state can significantly affect a party's choice of forum.8 '
Generally, the proper measure of damages in cases arising
under federal law is considered a federal issue and deter-
mined under appropriate federal law.8 2  However, dam-
ages arising in a diversity case may be subject to
applicable state law.83
B. State Decisions
Although the position taken in cases brought under fed-
eral law is fairly well established, 4 a federal court adheres
to state law if it can determine what that state law is. 8 5
7m Barrett, 660 F. Supp. at 1318.
7I Id.; see also O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1959).
O'Connor held that income taxes should be deducted from the decedent's esti-
mated future earnings under the FTCA. Id. at 584. The court also noted that
Oklahoma law implied that "take home" pay was the proper basis for an award of
lost earnings. Id. at 585.
-, Annotation, supra note 7, at 594.
81 Id.; see Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 184-85 (1st Cir. 1974)
(court allowed deduction for decedent's state and federal income taxes from
wrongful death award).
.2 Annotation, supra note 7, at 594; see also Turcotte, 494 F.2d at 177 (Rhode
Island applies state law to conflict of law cases only after weighing factors such as
predictability of results, simplification of judicial tasks, advancement of the fo-
rum's interest and application of the better rule of law).
- Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 493 (stating that the measure of damages in a FELA action
is federal in character). The federal nature of damages in a FELA action remains
even when the action is brought in state court. Norfolk S. Ry. v. Rayburn, 213 Va.
812, 195 S.E.2d 860, 864 (1973) (holding that in a FELA personal injury suit, the
trial court did not err in refusing to give an instruction advising the jury that any
award was not subject to income taxes).
- Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 493-94; Hobbs, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful Death in
Alabama Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 48 ALA. LAw. 16, 17 (1987) (established
method is calculating lost earnings on an after-tax basis); see also Note, supra note
6, at 312-13 (although courts recognize the holding in Liepelt, they consider it
controlling only if a federal action is involved).
"- Elligett, supra note 9, at 647-48. If state law differs from federal common law,
state law, if determinable, is applied. ld.; see also Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d
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States continue to disagree as to which method best com-
pensates the plaintiff without unduly burdening the de-
fendant. Most state authority holds that it is improper to
deduct potential taxes from the lost future income calcu-
lation.86 Gross pay, and not take-home pay, is the proper
basis upon which to calculate loss of future earnings.8 7
Courts which embrace the majority view often limit their
decision to the facts of the situation presented to them.88
One limitation in particular is to the type of income in-
volved; 89 for example, using gross income with respect to
1084, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1980) (Louisiana's wrongful death statute did not include
a deduction for federal income taxes; the court upheld a calculation based on
gross income because the statute was a creation of the state), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
981 (1981).
- See, e.g., Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967) (damage award
for impairment of future earning capacity in a personal injury action is not re-
duced by estimated income taxes on future income); Seely v. McEvers, 115 Ariz.
171, 564 P.2d 394, 397 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that gross pay, and not net
pay, is the proper basis for computing loss of future income); Hall v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 5 111. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955) (incident of taxation in a per-
sonal injury suit is not considered by the jury); Lumber Terminals, Inc. v. Nowa-
kowski, 36 Md. App. 82, 373 A.2d 282, 291 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (award of
damages in personal injury action is based upon plaintiff's gross earning capacity
and is not reduced because of income tax considerations); Johnson v. Manhattan
& Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 71 N.Y.2d 198, 519 N.E.2d 326, 328,
524 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417-18 (1988) (holding that in a wrongful death action, gross
income is the standard to measure value of income already lost and to measure
loss of future earnings as well); Girard Trust Corn Exch. Park v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 530, 190 A.2d 293, 297-98 (1963) (income tax consequences
are not considered in fixing damages in a wrongful death action for the determi-
nation of decedent's earning capacity); Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d
582, 591-92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (trial court did not err in refusing evidence of
income tax withholding on plaintiff's gross earnings); Hage v. Anderson, 200 Va.
364, 106 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1958) (gross pay and not net pay controls in assessing
damages for loss of wages caused by personal injuries).
.7 Seely, 115 Ariz. at 171, 564 P.2d at 397; see supra note 86 for a listing of cases
that calculate a lost earnings damage award based on gross income.
Is Annotation, supra note 7, at 606. Several courts have "ruled that it is im-
proper to take income taxes into consideration" but limited such ruling by refer-
ring to the particular type of income involved in the case, the amount of such
income, or the time it should have been earned. Id; see, e.g., Beaulieu, 434 P.2d at
673 (holding that an award for future earnings is not reduced by income taxes,
but that reduction is proper for portion of award constituting past loss of income).
- Beaulieu, 434 P.2d at 673 (distinguishing between past and future income).
Relevant factors under "type" of income involved include the nature of the in-
come, its amount, and when it would have been earned. Annotation, supra note 7,
at 606.
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future or current earnings and net income with respect to
past wages.90
In addition to the disparity between state and federal
actions, some courts also differentiate between personal
injury and wrongful death actions.9" A wrongful death ac-
tion is a statutorily created cause of action. The objective
of wrongful death statutes is to compensate the survivors
for the value of benefits they would have received from
the decedent.92 Income taxes reduce both the amount
available for the support of the survivors and the amount
of earnings the decedent could have accumulated during
his lifetime.93 Therefore, theoretically, reducing an award
by the amount of applicable income taxes is not depriving
the survivor of anything he would have received had the
income actually been earned. The same reasoning can
apply to personal injury awards for lost wages. Reducing
an award for income tax does not deprive the plaintiff of
any amount he would have received had he actually
earned the income.
Another distinction sometimes drawn in tax effect argu-
ments is between past loss of income and future loss of
income.94 Arguments of uncertainty and speculation do
not apply to the portion of the award lost before the time
of the trial. 95 Those taxes are easily calculated using appli-
cable income tax rates. However, distinguishing between
past and future lost income places an additional burden
!"' See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text for a brief discussion regarding
the distinction between income lost prior to trial and income lost post trial.
,1 Annotation, supra note 7, at 594. Compare Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398,
405, 298 P.2d 1034, 1038 (incident of income taxes has no part in determining
correct amount for personal injury damages), modified on other grounds, 81 Ariz. 121,
301 P.2d 1032 (1956), with Lux v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 803 F.2d 304, 310
(7th Cir. 1986) (amount of income tax attributable to decedent's lost earnings is
relevant to plaintiff's pecuniary damages) (both cases applying Arizona law).
Bradford, supra note 17, at 231.
'Id.
Beaulieu, 434 P.2d at 673. The Supreme Court of Alaska expressly requires
the deduction of income taxes in determining wages lost from date of decedent's
death to time of trial (past lost earnings). Id.
115 See Annotation, supra note 7, at 607.
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on the jury by requiring even more calculations on their
part.
A fewer number of states embrace the idea that a de-
duction for income taxes is a proper element in the calcu-
lation of lost income. 96 As for the speculative nature of
taxes, an award based on net income simply requires
"guessing" the income after taxes instead of before.97
Some state courts explicitly require that taxes on lost
earnings be taken into account in determining damages.98
Additionally, some courts in the minority position also
make reference to or limit their holdings to particular
types of income.99
C. Conclusion
The most logical, and apparently Congressionally sup-
ported, 100 answer is the "majority" view. Under this view,
income taxes are not deducted in determining the amount
of lost income or lost support in a personal injury or
wrongful death action. The Federal Income Tax Code is
1w See, e.g., Ruff v. Weintraub, 105 NJ. 233, 519 A.2d 1384, 1386-88 (1987)
(personal injury action in which the court held that plaintiff's damages are calcu-
lated on the basis of net income after taxes, and awards for future lost wages are
accordingly reduced by an amount representing future tax liability); Tenore v. Nu
Car Carriers, Inc., 67 NJ. 466, 341 A.2d 613, 628-29 (1975) (wrongful death ac-
tion in which court held that under New Jersey wrongful death statute, plaintiff's
recovery is calculated on basis of testimony or extrinsic evidence that proves de-
ceased's net income after taxes).
.,l McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 41 (2d
Cir.) (Lumbard, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
1-s Thornton & Schwartz, Calculating Lost Earnings In Wrongful Death Cases: The
Pennsylvania Experience, 58 PA. B.A.Q. 37, 39 (1987). For an example of a statutory
enactment, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.18(5), 768.21 (6)(a) (West 1984) (provid-
ing that damages for future lost wages in the wrongful death context are based on
"net accumulations"; net accumulations are defined as being "probable gross in-
come after taxes").
", Annotation, supra note 7, at 611; see Adams v. Deur, 173 N.W.2d 100, 105-06
(Iowa 1969) (holding that in a wrongful death action taxes may be considered in
calculating plaintiff's damages for past and future earnings, but taxes are irrele-
vant, and therefore not considered, in calculating damages for future family
services.).
1- See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1987) which provides that damage awards for per-
sonal injury or sickness are not included in gross income and thus are not taxable;
see supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text for further discussion of the section
104 exclusion.
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uncontroverted evidence that Congress intended to be-
stow a benefit upon the injured party. The benefit results
from section 104, which excludes from gross income any
damages awarded because of personal injuries, whether
awarded through a law suit or by settlement agreement.' 0'
There is no evidence that Congress intended the courts to
void this benefit through jury consideration, and subse-
quent deduction, of income taxes. If income taxes are not
deducted from awards for lost income, no "unjustified
windfall" results to the plaintiff. Moreover, the result of
allowing such a deduction is that the defendant tortfeasor
profits from a statute enacted to benefit the injured plain-
tiff. Additionally, any requirement imposed upon the jury
to apply different rules to different types of income only
creates added confusion and adds additional burdens to
an already difficult task.
IV. PROPRIETY OF INSTRUCTING THE JURY
The court must also decide whether taxability of an
award should be openly addressed at trial; that is, whether
or not the court should instruct the jury as to the taxabil-
ity of a personal injury or wrongful death damage award.
The average juror may or may not know of the "tax ex-
empt status" of such damage awards." 2 Some courts ar-
gue that if the jury does not know of the nontaxability of
the award, they will mistakenly inflate their verdict to
compensate the plaintiff for his presumed tax liability.
Courts have generally responded to this issue in one of
three ways: (1) accepting the notion that the jury is igno-
rant of tax laws and, therefore, is entitled to such an in-
struction; 0 3 (2) rejecting the idea of an instruction
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1987).
See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tax exempt
status of personal injury and wrongful death awards.
-.1 Annotation, supra note 7, at 593; see infra notes 124-29 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the view that a tax instruction is proper and necessary to
protect against erroneously inflated jury verdicts.
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altogether;10 4 and finally, (3) allowing the trial judge the
discretion to decide as he sees fit.' 0 5 A fourth category
exists in which the court has simply followed the holding
of the court below without stating the rationale behind its
decision. 10 6
A. Federal Position
The initial consideration is whether the claim is one
based on state or federal law. The 1980 Supreme Court
decision of Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Liepelt 107 addressed the
position taken by the courts regarding claims brought
under federal law. Liepelt was a wrongful death action
brought under FELA.'0 8 The court noted the prevailing
practice of refusing to allow evidence regarding the effect
of income taxes, but explicitly overruled it. 1° 9
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that, as
a matter of law, damages in a FELA action are federal in
character and governed by federal law." I 0 The measure of
damages in a wrongful death action brought under FELA
is the monetary loss suffered by beneficiaries caused by
the decedent's death."' Realistically, such a loss is calcu-
lated by taking the decedent's after-tax income into ac-
1'4 Annotation, supra note 7, at 593; see infra notes 118-123 for a discussion of
the majority position which rejects a taxability instruction.
-r, Annotation, supra note 7, at 593; see infra notes 130-132 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the discretionary view.
1m; Annotation, supra note 7, at 593; see infra notes 136-137 and accompanying
text for court decisions which silently follow the ruling of the court below.
"'7 444 U.S. 490, reh g denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
Io, Id. The case involved a 1973 collision caused by an employer's negligence
which resulted in fatal injuries to an employed fireman. Id. at 491.
... Id. at 490-91. The court noted the prevailing practice developed when fed-
eral taxes were relatively insignificant and observed a growing trend toward a dif-
ferent practice. Id. at 491.
,w Id. at 493. The rationale that damages in a FELA action are governed by
federal law is based, in part, on the purpose behind the enactment of FELA, which
is to create a uniform rule of law regarding railroads' liability for injuries to their
employees. Id. at 493 n.5.
1 Id. at 493 (quoting Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70 (1913),
the Court stated that the proper measure of damages is "the damages . . .[that]
flow from the deprivation of the pecuniary benefits which the beneficiaries might
have reasonably received .... ).
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count. 12 The Court rejected arguments supporting the
exclusion of the decedent's tax liability. Those arguments
claimed tax consequences were too speculative, too com-
plex, and opened the door to other equally relevant evi-
dence. 3  The Court concluded by acknowledging the
"tax consciousness" of the public and noting that a brief
and easily understood instruction is not harmful." 4 Addi-
tionally, it may help to prevent overcompensation by
preventing the jury from falsely inflating the award.' 5
B. States' Position
Despite the United States Supreme Court's support for
the introduction of income tax evidence and a "taxability"
instruction to the jury, most state courts do not follow this
decision on matters involving state law." t 6 Once again,
majority and minority positions exist on the subject of the
propriety of a jury "taxability" instruction.' 7 A majority
112 Id.
1 Id. at 494-96. The Court refers to "other equally relevant evidence" as in-
cluding the consequences of discounting to present value and attorney fees. Id. at
495. This portion of the respondent's argument is rejected simply because the
court does not agree with it. Id. The "too speculative argument" is rejected due
to the fact that the other factors used to calculate a damage award, such as future
employment and interest rates, are matters of estimate and prediction. Id. at 494.
The "too complex" argument is rejected in light of the legal profession's ability to
present expert testimony in a form that is understandable by the jury. Id.
114 Id. at 498. The Court held that reversible error was committed when the
lower court refused to give an instruction informing the jury that a judgment
under FELA was not taxable. Id.
,,5 Id. (quoting Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th Cir.
1975)).
1 Liepelt is considered by several courts as controlling only in an action under
federal law. See Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding Liepelt was not controlling because the wrongful death action arose under
a state statute, and federal concerns were lacking), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981
(1981); Klawonn v. Mitchell, 105 I1. 2d 450, 475 N.E.2d 857, 860-61 (1985)
(holding that Liepelt was not directly controlling because the case involved state,
rather than federal, law); Tennis v. General Motors Corp., 625 S.W.2d 218, 226-
28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give a
taxability instruction to the jury because the case was a state action in state court
and lacked any federal concern); Otis Elevator Co. v. Reid, 101 Nev. 515, 706
P.2d 1378, 1382 (1985) (the Supreme Court of Nevada stated that in a claim aris-
ing under state law, it was not bound to follow the United States Supreme Court
decision in Liepelt which was expressly predicated on federal law).
"17 See Annotation, supra note 7, at 595-600.
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of the states hold, as a general rule, that such an instruc-
tion is improper. 1 8 Although not a wide-spread practice,
I Combs v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750,
757 (N.D. Iowa 1955) (holding that the issue of income tax liability should not be
injected into an instruction to the jury because it "would probably give rise to
more problems than it would solve."); Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d
1034, 1037-38 (finding that few courts had passed on the issue of an instruction
regarding the taxability of damages, the court agreed with the three states consti-
tuting a majority that the question of income tax has no part in the instruction on
damages), modifiedon other grounds, 81 Ariz. 121, 301 P.2d 1032 (1956); Henninger
v. Southern Pac. Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 872, 59 Cal. Rptr. 76, 81 (1967) (noting
the majority of courts which considered the issue of income tax instructions con-
cluded they should not be given to the jury, the court followed the majority);
Davis v. Fortino & Jackson Chevrolet Co., 32 Colo. App. 222, 510 P.2d 1376,
1378 (1973) (holding that an instruction on the taxability of damages was not
prescribed by the Colorado Jury Instructions, and would have been improper);
Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 271 A.2d 94, 96 (1970)
(holding that "[t]he great weight of authority in the United States is committed to
the rule that, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries, an instruction
... [involving the taxability of damages] is improper and, when requested, should
be refused."); Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Haw. 42, 51, 410 P.2d 976, 981 (1966)
(the court held that it was "in agreement with those jurisdictions which hold that
the incidence of taxation is not a proper fact for a jury's consideration" since it
introduces a wholly collateral issue into the determination of damages); Hall v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Il. 2d 135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955) (holding that it
is improper for ajury to consider the incident of taxation because it introduces an
extraneous subject); Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 507-08, 134 N.E.2d 555,
556, petition dismissed, 235 Ind. 509, 135 N.E.2d 251 (1956) (finding inquiries into
the incidents of taxation in personal injury damage suits are not a proper subject
for instructions to the jury because they bring up new issues not pertinent to the
issues involved); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr., 186 Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18, 24
(1960) (following the majority rule that instructing the jury that damages awarded
for personal injury are exempt from state or federal income taxes would be im-
proper); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Ky. 1958)
(deciding to follow the majority view because a taxability instruction is "mislead-
ing in its effect on the minds of the jury"); Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 535
(Me. 1978) (holding that whether a plaintiff must pay taxes on an award concerns
only the government and the plaintiff, not the jury); Briggs v. Chicago Great W.
Ry., 248 Minn. 418, 432, 80 N.W.2d 625, 636 (1957) (holding that the incidence
of federal income taxation is not a proper factor for inclusion injury instructions
in a personal injury suit); Senter v. Ferguson, 486 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972) (finding that an instuction regarding the taxability of damages constituted
prejudicial error and might have influenced the amount of the verdict); Bracy v.
Great N. Ry., 136 Mont. 65, 343 P.2d 848, 853 (1959) (holding that the lower
court did not err in refusing to instruct that the award is not subject to state or
federal income taxes), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 949 (1960); Ott v. Frank, 202 Neb. 820,
277 N.W.2d 251, 253 (1979) (decedent's potential tax liability was a proper evi-
dentiary matter, but was not a proper subject for special instruction); Scallon v.
Hooper, 58 N.C. App. 551, 293 S.E.2d 843, 845 (1982) (adopting the majority
view that a taxability instruction is reversible error); South v. National R.R. Pas-
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some courts go so far as to distinguish between personal
injury and wrongful death actions.'1 9
The Supreme Court of Indiana expressed concerns as
to how comprehensive such an instruction, if given, needs
to be. 120 In Highshew v. Kushto, it held that "incidents of
taxation" are not a proper subject for jury considera-
senger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 828 (N.D. 1980) (in light of Congressional intent
to give tax benefit to injured party, the court found it was not error not to instruct
the jury that the award is not subject to income tax in a personal injury action);
Maus v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E.2d
253, 256 (1955) (defendant's request for taxability instruction in personal injury
suit was correctly refused "since the effect would be to give the jury license to
disregard the charge on the measure of damages already given"); Chicago, Rock
Island & Pac. R.R. v. Kinsey, 372 P.2d 863, 868 (Okla. 1962) (holding, in line with
the majority view, that it was not error to refuse to give taxability instruction);
Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 266 Or. 666, 513 P.2d 1140, 1148 (1973) (in
a personal injury action, the court held it was not error to refuse to instruct the
jury regarding tax consequences considering the additional confusion a tax liabil-
ity instruction would create); Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, 421 A.2d 674, 680
(1980) (holding that the relationship between income taxes and the damage award
should not be mentioned either in argument or in jury instructions); Stallcup v.
Taylor, 62 Tenn. App. 407, 463 S.W.2d 416, 422 (1970) (holding that an instruc-
tion regarding the tax exemption of personal injury awards is not proper); Mis-
souri-Kansas-Texas R.R. of Tex. v. McFerrin, 279 S.W.2d 410, 418-19 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1955) (instructing the jury that a wrongful death award is exempt from in-
come tax presumes the jury will consider issues not before it; the court cannot
indulge in such assumptions ofjury misconduct), rev'd on other grounds, 291 S.W.2d
931 (Tex. 1956); Boeke v. International Paint Co., 27 Wash. App. 611, 620 P.2d
103, 106-07 (1980) (holding that no taxability instruction is necessary where the
plaintiff's income was not extremely high); Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 122
S.E.2d 18, 30-31 (1961) (concluding that consideration of taxes in a personal in-
jury suit might be confusing and create problems for either the plaintiff or the
defendant); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harry Crow & Son, Inc., 6 Wis. 2d 396, 94
N.W.2d 577, 581-83 (1959) (holding that plaintiff's tax liability on a personal in-
jury award is a matter left to the legislature); Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349,
1365-67 (Wyo. 1981) (holding that state court awards under state law are not
controlled by United States Supreme Court decision requiring instruction on in-
come taxes for claims brought under federal law).
III, Annotation, supra note 7, at 595 n.10. "While most jurisdictions do not
make any apparent distinction between personal injury and wrongful death ac-
tions in regard to this rule, there have been some exceptions, and it is conceivable
that others might choose to apply a different rule for each type of action." Id.; see
supra note 91 for an illustration of one jurisdiction that differentiates between
treatment of personal injury awards and lost income awards.
"ill Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555, petition dismissed, 235
Ind. 509, 135 N.E.2d 251 (1956). In Highshew, a personal injury case, the court
held that an instruction to the jury advising them that any award to the plaintiff is
not subject to income tax was not proper. Id. at 505, 134 N.E.2d at 556.
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tion.' 2 ' According to the court, inquiry into the tax area
requires detailed and complex instructions as to both tax
and non-tax liabilities.' 22 The court stated it cannot give
instructions, dealing with all possible tax implications,
with any degree of certainty without "a tax expert at its
side."1 23
Some jurisdictions hold that a tax instruction is not only
proper, but necessary to set the appropriate amount of
damages. 24 In jurisdictions which hold that income tax
effects should not reduce an award, three justifications in
particular support an instruction to that effect. First, it is
the only way to protect against erroneously inflated jury
121 Id. at 505, 134 N.E.2d at 556.
122 Id. at 505, 134 N.E.2d at 556.
121 Id. at 505, 134 N.E.2d at 556. The court further stated that "[i]n our judg-
ment such matters are not a proper subject for instruction or argument of coun-
sel." Id. at 505, 134 N.E.2d at 556.
,.4 Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918, 925-26 (1957)
(wrongful death action holding that an assessment of reasonable compensation
for loss includes offsetting decedent's income by probable incomes taxes); State
Highway Dep't v. Buzzuto, 264 A.2d 347, 357 (Del. 1970) (holding the trial judge
erred in refusing a requested instruction in a wrongful death action that the award
is not subject to state or federal income taxes); Francis v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., 376 So. 2d 609, 612 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that an instruction
informing the jury that "any amount [awarded] . . . is not subject to income tax"
was authorized and was not erroneous); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251
S.W.2d 42, 45-46 (1952) (prospectively ruling that to avoid any juror misconcep-
tions regarding the taxability of a personal injury award, an instruction that such
an award is not subject to federal or state income taxes is desirable); Anderson v.
Burlington N., Inc., 218 Mont. 456, 709 P.2d 641, 646-47 (1985) (prospective
only) (holding that trial court should give a nontaxability instruction in the future
to avoid the possibility of overcompensation based on erroneous tax assumptions
by the jury), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986); Bussell v. DeWalt Prods. Corp., 105
NJ. 223, 519 A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (1987) (applying the Tenore rule to personal
injury actions, the court held that a taxability instruction was appropriate for per-
sonal injury damage awards); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 NJ. 466, 341
A.2d 613, 628-29 (1975) (holding that in a wrongful death action, the court
should instruct the jury that the damage award is not subject to income taxation);
Lanzano v. New York, 71 N.Y.2d 208, 519 N.E.2d 331, 332, 524 N.Y.S.2d 420,
422 (1988) (holding that, as a matter of policy, where the award is excluded from
taxation, the court should instruct the jury that the award is not taxable and that
the jury is not to add or to subtract from the award because of income taxes);
Towli v. Ford Motor Co., 30 A.D.2d 319, 292 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968)
(holding that when a jury questioned the court as to whether an award to the
plaintiff is taxable, the court should have answered the jury's question directly).
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verdicts. 2 5 Moreover, such an instruction is easily under-
stood. Finally, it requires no calculation. 2 6 Judge Ely
wrote, "To put the matter simply, giving the instruction
can do no harm, and it can certainly help by preventing
the jury from inflating the award and thus overcompensat-
ing the plaintiff on the basis of an erroneous assumption
that the judgment will be taxable.' 27 The reasoning set
out above in Liepelt for FELA cases is just as persuasive
when dealing with other personal injury cases. In 1981,
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, while noting
that Liepelt expressed a minority view, held the courts
must provide a "taxability" instruction.' 28  The court
found that such an instruction was a "simple and non-
prejudicial way to deal with [a jury's] tax
consciousness." 129
The third alternative embraced by the courts leaves the
decision within the discretion of the trial judge. 3 0 Some
courts which embrace this view hold that taxability in-
structions are appropriate "only as curative devices
designed to eliminate any prejudice resulting from the
jury's exposure to tax-related issues at trial."' 3'' The
lower court uses its discretion to determine whether tax-
related issues were discussed during trial and whether
such discussions were significant enough to warrant a tax-
,Ir, McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 40 (2d
Cir.) (Lumbard, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
126 Id. at 41.
Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th Cir. 1975).
' Dennis v. Blanchfield, 48 Md. App. 325, 428 A.2d 80, 87 (1981).
- Id. at 325, 428 A.2d at 87.
Poirier v. Shireman, 129 So. 2d 439, 444-45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (court
held that "on this question and on these facts," a nontaxability instruction was not
error); Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 380 Mass. 362, 403 N.E.2d 402 (1980)
(holding that tax instruction is appropriate only in special circumstances such as
when tax-related issues were discussed during the trial); Otis Elevator Co. v. Reid,
101 Nev. 515, 706 P.2d 1378, 1382 (1985) (holding that in the absence of any
indication that the subject of income tax was presented to the jury, refusal to give
instruction was not error; if subject has been presented to jury, judge must, in his
best judgment and discretion, determine whether an insturction is warranted); see
also Annotation, supra note 7, at 601.
,:, Otis Elevator Co., 101 Nev. at 515, 706 P.2d at 1382.
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ability instruction. 13
2
In conjunction with the discretionary view is the view
expressed by the Indiana Court of Appeals.' 33 Recogniz-
ing the rule of law set out by the Supreme Court of Indi-
ana, the court held that an instruction regarding the tax
consequences of a damage award was not proper.1 34 De-
spite the lower court's "taxability" instruction, however,
the appellate court found the instruction harmless under
the particular circumstances of the case.' 35
Although most courts follow one of the three rationales
discussed above, a few remaining jurisdictions follow the
ruling of the trial court without explanation. The review-
ing courts hold that the decision in the trial court was not
reversible error, without stating what factors influenced
their decision. 36 These courts address the issue, but they
fail to clarify the reasoning behind their position. 37 In
these cases not stating a general rule, the courts uphold
1 Id. at 515, 706 P.2d at 1382. A taxability instruction is not given as "a matter
of right," but is only appropriate in special circumstances. Id. at 515, 706 P.2d at
1382.
I.- Wickizer v. Medley, 169 Ind. App. 332, 348 N.E.2d 96, 99-100 (1976).
.4 Id at 332, 348 N.E.2d at 99.
Id. at 332, 348 N.E.2d at 100. The court stated that the "instruction given
•.. merely served to caution the jury to base its award on the evidence, and not on
speculations about tax consequences," and concluded that the instruction re-
sulted in no prejudice to the plaintiffs. Id. at 332, 348 N.E.2d at 100. A similar
result was reached in Montana. Anderson v. Burlington N., Inc., 218 Mont. 456,
709 P.2d 641 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986). The Supreme Court of
Montana, in dicta, stated that in the future a nontaxability instruction for a FELA
case is warranted in light of Liepelt. Id. at 456, 709 P.2d at 646-47; see supra notes
107-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of Liepelt. However, despite the
failure of the trial court to give a nontaxability instruction in this case, the court
ruled that such failure was harmless because the jury awarded less than the
amount of damages projected by the economist. Id. at 456, 709 P.2d at 646. The
court's rationale was that the jury clearly did not award additional damages based
upon perceived tax obligations. Id. at 456, 709 P.2d at 646.
1:.,. Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1096-98 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 981 (1981) (applying Louisiana law); Hageman v. Signal L. P. Gas, Inc.,
486 F.2d 479, 485 (6th Cir. 1973) (applying Ohio law); Caporossi v. Atlantic City,
220 F. Supp. 508, 525 (D.N.J. 1963), aff'd, 328 F.2d 620 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 825 (1964) (applying New Jersey law); Salsgiver v. E.S. Ritter Co., 42 Or.
App. 547, 600 P.2d 951, 952-53 (1979); see also Annotation, supra note 7, at 602.
,.7 Note, supra note 6, at 316.
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decisions of trial courts not to give taxability instructions
as well as decisions which gave such instructions.
C. Conclusion
Given the tax consciousness of the American public, an
instruction to the jury stating that personal injury and
wrongful death awards are not taxable is the better view.
This view does not necessarily advocate detailed and com-
plex instructions as to both tax and non-tax liabilities. 13 8
The court must give the jury a simple and easily under-
stood instruction.13 9 An instruction informing the jury of
the non-taxability of the award is an appropriate and ef-
fective method to deter erroneous inflation of the
award. 140 Even in jurisdictions which have concluded that
the effect of income taxes is an appropriate consideration,
a simple instruction informing the jury of that factor and
how to apply it would aid in the jury's calculations. Obvi-
ously, if tax effects are considered, the evidence presented
to the jury will include projections of future income tax
liability and facts as to past income tax liability. The jury
needs instructions concerning the handling of that
information.
V. AIR CRASH CASES
With potential damage awards ranging from tens of
thousands to the millions, an extremely important consid-
eration for parties in a personal injury action or for par-
ties suing under a wrongful death statute is the applicable
state law with respect to the calculation of damage
awards.' 4' Considering the current split of authority as to
1:.. Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555, 556, petition dismissed,
235 Ind. 509, 135 N.E.2d 251 (1956) (found that detailed and complex tax related
instructions contain a substantial amount of uncertainty).
-t, McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 40 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 870 (1960).
,", Id. at 40.
1 Annotation, supra note 7, at 594. "It has been held that allowing or preclud-
ing the deduction of taxes from a lost income award would have so important an
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whether income taxes are a relevant consideration, it is
imperative that courts apply the proper state law.
In particular, two recent federal circuit cases exemplify
the intense debate, and consequent results, that continues
over the correct application of state law in calculating loss
of income damages. 4 2 In line with the majority view is
the 1987 decision from the Second Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals, Woodling v. Garrett Corp. 4I How-
ever, the Seventh Circuit issued an equally strong opinion
supporting the deduction of income taxes from future lost
earnings in Lux v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 144
Woodling v. Garrett Corp. was a wrongful death action
brought after the death of an airplane passenger. 45 On
appeal, Woodling contended that the district court erred
in allowing the deduction of future taxes from the dece-
dent's estimated future income. 46 Following the well-es-
tablished principle set out in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 14 7 the
court found that New York state law providing for "fair
and just compensation" controlled the measure of dam-
ages. 48 As a result, the Second Circuit concluded that in-
effect on the fortunes of the parties as to significantly affect their choice of forum
.... Id.
1-, In addition to the two cases which are discussed, several other recent cases
considering tax implications involved the airline industry. The United States
Court of Appeals, in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979,
701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1983), found Illinois' measure of damages was the same
as the measure under FELA, thereby authorizing the district court to admit evi-
dence of income tax liability. Id. at 1195. Applying New York law, Vasina v.
Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1981), held that the lower court did not
err in refusing to admit evidence on the effect of income taxes in determining a
wrongful death damages award. Id. at 118.
-. 813 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1987).
144 803 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1986).
145 Woodling, 813 F.2d at 546. In Woodling, the action was brought against the
owner and operator of the aircraft which crashed and against the manufacturer
and repairer of an engine part alleged to have caused the crash. Id.
-1 Id. at 557.
,4 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the Supreme Court first established the princi-
ple that a federal court sitting in a diversity action must apply the substantive law
of the applicable state. Id. Additionally, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941), extends the Erie doctrine to the field of conflict of laws. Id. at
496. The Court in Klaxon held that in a diversity action, a federal court must apply
the choice of law rules prevailing in the state in which it sits. Id.
... Woodling, 813 F.2d at 557. The court noted that "an action for wrongful
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come taxes are not a proper consideration in determining
lost income or support.
149
Although the court in Woodling had definite New York
precedent to follow in reaching its decision, this was not
the case in the Seventh Circuit decision of Lux v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. 150 Again, the issue was whether evidence
of the decedent's income taxes was admissible in a wrong-
ful death action to reduce the amount awarded as com-
pensation for lost support. 15 ' Recognizing that a federal
court sitting in diversity must apply the applicable state
law, the court turned to the question of what damages Ar-
izona law allowed. 152 The Arizona wrongful death statute
provides for damages as the jury "deems fair and just."'1 53
Arizona courts had not decided whether a lost income
award was properly determined on the decedent's gross
or net income. 154
death is one created by state law and that state law controls the correct measure of
damages for such a claim." Id. The district court had concluded that, although
the passenger and his survivors were residents of Connecticut, New York law
would govern in determining wrongful death damages because New York was the
site of the accident and tortious conduct resulting in the accident, the principle
place of business of the primary defendant, and the forum chosen by the plaintiff.
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Garrett, 625 F. Supp. 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in
part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom., Woodling v. Garrett Corp., 813 F.2d 543
(2d Cir. 1987). Although the difference in law between the states of New York
and Connecticut is not as divergent as a "majority" versus "minority" type con-
flict, the state laws did differ. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 625 F. Supp. at 760.
Connecticut law allows for "just damages" which includes a claim for the "dece-
dent's lost enjoyment of life." Id. at 761. New York law, on the other hand, calls
for "fair and just compensation," which means recovery for pecuniary loss only.
Id.
... Woodling, 813 F.2d at 557. The court followed the rule established in Vasina
v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1981), which held that New York law
does not allow the jury to consider the effect of income taxes on lost income.
Woodling, 813 F.2d at 557.
803 F.2d at 304.
Id. at 309-12. The case was a wrongful death action brought by the widow
under an Arizona wrongful death statute for damages resulting from the death of
the pilot. Id. at 306.
Id. at 309-10.
... ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-613 (1982). The statute provides that "[i]n an
action for wrongful death, the jury shall give such damages as it deems fair and
just with reference to the injury resulting from the death to the surviving parties
who may be entitled to recover .... " Id.
i'r Lux, 803 F.2d at 310. The court specifically stated, "[wihether the measure
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The Arizona Supreme Court had previously held in per-
sonal injury suits that income taxes are not an appropriate
consideration for the jury and that the proper amount for
calculating lost future earnings is gross, as opposed to
net, income. 5 5 The Seventh Circuit expressly refused to
apply the same rationale in a wrongful death case, con-
cluding that the Arizona Supreme Court would apply a
different rule under the circumstances. 56 Looking to the
Restatement, 57 the circuit court concluded that the dece-
dent's income taxes are a relevant factor in the determina-
tion of damages in a wrongful death action and should
have been admitted.158
With the district court judgment for lost support in
Woodling amounting to $750,000 and a damage award in
excess of $3,000,000 in Lux, the tremendous potential im-
pact of income taxes on a judge or jury verdict is readily
apparent.'" Whether a court determines that federal law
of the plaintiff's pecuniary damages for lost support in wrongful death actions is
the decedent's gross income or the surviving parties' net pecuniary loss . . . has
not been decided by any Arizona court." Id.
'.1 Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 405, 298 P.2d 1034, 1038 (stating that the
"case [should] be tried on the issues and presented to the jury with the correct
measure of damages, of which the incident of income tax has no part."), modified on
other grounds, 81 Ariz. 121, 301 P.2d 1032 (1956); Seely v. McEvers, 115 Ariz. 171,
174, 564 P.2d 394, 397 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that the proper basis for
calculating loss of future earnings is "gross pay and not net or 'take home' pay").
1.- Lux, 803 F.2d at 310-11. The court stated that "decisions addressing the
admissibility of evidence of income taxes in personal injury cases [do] not govern
the admissibility of such evidence in wrongful death cases." Id. at 310.
1.'7 The court noted that the Arizona Supreme Court continuously asserted that
"in the absence of controlling statute or precedent, it [would] follow the Restate-
ment of the Law whenever it is applicable." Id. at 311. In this case, the court
turned to the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id.; see Bank of Am. v. J & S Auto
Repairs, 143 Ariz. 416, 418, 694 P.2d 246, 248 (1985) (Restatement followed in
Arizona in the absence of contrary authority). According to the Seventh Circuit,
the Restatement's position with respect to income taxes in wrongful death actions
is clear. Lux, 803 F.2d at 311. The loss to the plaintiff is measured by the "contri-
butions that the deceased would have made to [the injured party] if he had lived."
Id. (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914A comment b (Tent.
Draft No. 19, 1973)). Therefore, the Restatement supports reducing lost earnings
by potential taxes to determine the amount the decedent would have contributed
to the plaintiff had he lived. Id.
'" Lux, 803 F.2d at 311.
... For example: Using the basic 28% tax bracket for a married individual filing
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or state law is applicable, 160 the potential advantages and
disadvantages of one forum over another cannot be un-
duly stressed.
A statutory body of law particularly relevant to the air-
line industry is the Warsaw Convention. Federal courts
have concluded that the calculation of damages under the
Warsaw Convention need not consider the effect of in-
come taxes.' 6 ' The fluctuating and speculative tendencies
of national or local taxes introduces an unnecessary com-
plexity in the determination of a damage award under the
Warsaw Convention. 162 An international procedure such
as that stipulated by the Warsaw Convention requires
only a fair and reasonable result. 63
VI. CONCLUSION
The principle problem with respect to income taxes is
not whether a court should consider the tax implications
of a lost income award or how to instruct the jury as to
jointly after 1987, a lost wages award of $750,000 is subject to $206,132.50 in
federal income tax.
"A, See, e.g., Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 49-51 (2d
Cir. 1984) (wrongful death diversity action resulting from the crash of a commer-
cial airliner; held that when state law claims are tried in federal court, state law
governs the method of calculating damages and no adjustment for tax liability is
permitted); DeLucca v. United States, 670 F.2d 843, 844 (9th Cir. 1982) (FTCA
action; damages governed by state law but limited by the Act to compensatory
damages); Rudelson v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1979) (FTCA
action following midair collision; taxes were appropriately deducted); Kennett v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 560 F.2d 456, 461-62 (1st Cir. 1977) (wrongful death action
following airplane crash; when no evidence before jury on income tax, court has
no duty to instruct jury to speculate concerning income tax effects); Feldman v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 387 (2d Cir. 1975) (wrongful death diver-
sity action following airline crash; under Connecticut law, judgment reduced by
income taxes payable on future earnings); Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990,
1005 (6th Cir. 1975) (Florida Wrongful Death Act required deduction of taxes).
-1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation By Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.T.N.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) (commonly re-
ferred to as the Warsaw Convention); see Butler v. Aeromexico, 774 F.2d 429, 431
(1 th Cir. 1985) (holding that in wrongful death action brought under the War-
saw Convention, the district court need not consider the impact of federal income
tax in awarding damages).
Butler, 774 F.2d at 431.
I d.
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that question. The difficulties arise because of the lack of
a uniform rule, regardless of which direction that rule
takes. Inconsistencies are apparent between federal and
state law as well as among the several states.
The rationales on either side of the arguments, both
pro and con, are valid.' 64 Differences arise when one
court gives a particular rationale or combination of ratio-
nales more weight than another court. The resulting vari-
ety of treatment of the tax issue has led to forum
shopping and considerable emphasis on the application of
the appropriate state law. Although this comment ad-
vances the proposition that the proper method of deter-
mining lost income awards is to use gross income figures
in conjunction with a "taxability" instruction, all of the ar-
guments deserve due consideration. 165 Regardless of
which rationale the courts agree upon, agreement is what
the courts ultimately need to accomplish.
-4 See supra notes 16-50 and accompanying text for the arguments both pro
and con regarding the consideration of income taxes in calculating a lost wages
award.
I-' See supra notes 51-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether
"gross" income or "net" income is the proper base for the determination of
damages.
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